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JUSTICE HOLMES’ LOGIC OF FORCE 
OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES JR. AND LEGAL 
LOGIC. Frederic R. Kellogg.1 Chicago, IL: University of 
Chicago Press, 2018. Pp. 229. $45.00 (Hardcover). 
Benjamin Patrick Newton2 
I.  FORCE OF LOGIC 
Skepticism is a defining characteristic of the jurisprudence of 
Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr.; but is it one born of deduction or 
induction? Induction, argues Frederic R. Kellogg, compelled 
Holmes to tentative legal generalities—specifically, moral 
generalities. Moreover, he maintains that Holmes did not 
advocate a legal realist position, that the law is what judges say it 
is, but rather that judges participate in an ongoing dialectical 
“social induction” to discover what the law is or ought to be. But 
Kellogg misunderstands that Holmes’ skepticism arose from his 
early conclusion that natural right cannot be known and the law 
is what the whim of the shifting dominant faction of the 
community says it is. Holmes deduced that law rests on force. 
Kellogg’s misunderstanding is owed to his omission of several of 
Holmes’ most important jurisprudential writings. 
Kellogg’s book, the third he has written on Holmes,3 and one 
intended for a wider audience, is divided into an introduction, ten 
chapters, bibliography, and index (pp. 7, 20). The introduction 
advances the plan of the book and its two main arguments, first, 
that Holmes’ skepticism is the result of an inductive turn in his 
reasoning, influenced principally by his reading of John Stuart 
 
 1. Visiting Professor, Federal University of Pernambuco, Recife, Brazil.   
 2. Assistant Professor of Political Science, Tarleton State University. 
 3. See FREDERIC ROGERS KELLOGG, FORMATIVE ESSAYS OF JUSTICE HOLMES: 
THE MAKING OF AN AMERICAN LEGAL PHILOSOPHY (1984); FREDERIC R. KELLOGG, 
OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., LEGAL THEORY, AND JUDICIAL RESTRAINT (2007).  
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Mill’s A System of Logic,4 and, second, that Holmes’ court 
decisions, especially his dissents, are the result of his stance that a 
judge’s rulings participate in a dialectical “social induction.” The 
first three chapters discuss Holmes’ early thought, Mill’s influence 
on it, and Holmes’ own expansion on Mill’s inductive reasoning 
toward “social induction.” The fourth and fifth chapters critique 
past criticisms of Holmes’ jurisprudence in light of the first three; 
most interestingly, in the fifth, Kellogg maintains that Holmes has 
been incorrectly labeled a legal realist. While the first half of the 
book focuses somewhat closely on Holmes and his writings, the 
second half focuses somewhat extensively on Holmesian scholars 
and their writings. Thus, the last five chapters do not have the 
coherence of the first five, as they seem to meander in analyzing 
further the book’s two main contentions, especially in light of 
other scholars’ own claims with regard to both. While Sheldon M. 
Novick’s edition of Holmes’ collected works5 is listed in the 
bibliography, a number of Holmes’ most important 
jurisprudential writings reproduced there are entirely omitted in 
Kellogg’s text and notes, most notably, “The Gas-Stokers’ Strike” 
and “Natural Law.”6 
Kellogg portrays Holmes as a Baconian empiricist (pp. 8, 21-
22, 31, 89, 99), one chiefly influenced by first meeting Mill and 
then reading his Logic in 1866 (pp. 8, 9, 18, 20, 22, 26, 37, 89ff., 
104, 169, 170). But whereas Mill emphasized the inductive 
reasoning which occurs within a single mind, Kellogg argues 
Holmes stressed the inductive reasoning which transpires among 
many minds. If induction is an epistemology of taking particular 
experiences and extracting from them provisional generalities, 
including legal generalities, “social induction” is an ongoing 
dialectic among many minds, contemplating and categorizing 
many experiences (pp. 21-22, 113). The benefits of such “social 
induction” are two. First, it indefinitely refines man’s 
understanding of what is naturally good for him, and thus allows 
for moral progress. Second, it acknowledges changing 
 
 4. See JOHN STUART MILL, A SYSTEM OF LOGIC, RATIOCINATIVE AND 
INDUCTIVE: BEING A CONNECTED VIEW OF THE PRINCIPLES OF EVIDENCE AND THE 
METHODS OF SCIENTIFIC INVESTIGATION (Harper & Brothers, 1848) (1843). 
 5. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, 1–3 THE COLLECTED WORKS OF JUSTICE HOLMES 
(Sheldon M. Novick ed., 1995). 
 6. Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Gas-Stokers’ Strike, 7 AM. L. REV. 582 (1873) 
[hereinafter Holmes, Strike]; Oliver Wendell Holmes, Natural Law, 32 HARV. L. REV. 40 
(1918) [hereinafter Holmes, Natural Law]. 
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circumstances, and so permits judges to rule in such a way that 
communal opinion and natural right roughly coincide to better 
ensure legal stability. It is in this way that Kellogg accounts for 
Holmes’ continual emphasis on the growth of the law (pp. 24, 57, 
66, 78, 86-87, 99, 106, 121, 142ff., 149, 179, 181). 
But while Holmes did indeed declare that law must reflect 
the opinion of the dominant faction of the community, insofar as 
a law contrary to it “would be empty words, not because it was 
wrong, but because it could not be enforced,” he rejected the 
possibility of natural right.7 The basis of this rejection was his 
conclusion that what cannot be quantified cannot be known. 
Holmes was certain only that man is selfish, all association is 
magnified selfishness, and the law conforms to the arbitrary 
opinion of the shifting dominant faction simply because it can be 
enforced. In short, the force of Holmes’ logic rests on Holmes’ 
logic of force: 
This mode of thinking [i.e., that the force behind the 
development of the law is logic] is entirely natural. The training 
of lawyers is a training in logic. The processes of analogy, 
discrimination, and deduction are those in which they are most 
at home. The language of judicial decision is mainly the 
language of logic. And the logical method and form flatter that 
longing for certainty and for repose which is in every human 
mind. But certainty generally is illusion, and repose is not the 
destiny of man. Behind the logical form lies a judgment as to 
the relative worth and importance of competing legislative 
grounds, often an inarticulate and unconscious judgment, it is 
true, and yet the very root and nerve of the whole proceeding. 
You can give any conclusion a logical form. You always can 
imply a condition in a contract. But why do you imply it? It is 
because of some belief as to the practice of the community or 
of a class, or because of some opinion as to policy, or, in short, 
because of some attitude of yours upon a matter not capable of 
exact quantitative measurement, and therefore not capable of 
founding exact logical conclusions. Such matters really are 
battle grounds where the means do not exist for determinations 
that shall be good for all time, and where the decision can do 
no more than embody the preference of a given body in a given 
 
 7. See Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 460 
(1897) [hereinafter Holmes, Path].   
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time and place.8 
 
Written in 1897, this passage from “The Path of the Law” 
reflects a settled jurisprudence which began as early as “The Gas-
Stokers’ Strike,” written in 1873,9 and which would continue as 
late as and beyond “Natural Law,” written in 1918.10 
II. LOGIC OF FORCE 
Holmes’ two most famous constitutional cases while serving 
on the Massachusetts Supreme Court are his dissents in Vegelahn 
v. Guntner and Plant v. Woods.11 Kellogg focuses on them as 
examples of Holmes’ inductive method (pp. 68, 80ff., 93, 97). 
However, in omitting “The Gas-Stokers’ Strike,” he neglects 
Holmes’ early conclusion about human nature from which he 
deduced the reasons for his dissents in both cases. As Holmes’ 
dissent in Plant is an application of his one in Vegelahn,12 I will 
focus on the latter. In Vegelahn v. Gunter, upholsterers working 
in a furniture factory in Boston asked for higher wages and shorter 
hours from their employer, Frederick Vegelahn; he refused and 
fired their agent, George Gunter. The upholsterers then picketed 
in front of the factory to persuade present employees to leave and 
deter potential ones from entering. Vegelahn sought an injunction 
from Holmes in the Equity Session of the Massachusetts Supreme 
Judicial Court; Holmes enjoined the workers from threats of 
personal injury or unlawful harm, but permitted the strike to 
continue. Vegelahn appealed to the full Massachusetts SJC, which 
overruled Holmes’ decision, holding that the union’s picketing 
interfered with the liberty of contract between employers and 
employees.13 Holmes dissented. 
In his dissent, Holmes dismissed as unwarranted the 
interpretation that the picketers’ actions constituted a threat of 
force understood as a threat of bodily harm. Two men walking up 
and down the sidewalk and speaking with passersby before they 
 
 8. Id. at 465–66. Consider this passage especially in light of the paragraph that 
immediately proceeds it. See also Oliver Wendell Holmes, Law in Science and Science in 
Law, 12 HARV. L. REV. 443 (1899).  
 9. Holmes, Strike, supra note 6. 
 10. Holmes, Natural Law, supra note 6. 
 11. Vegelahn v. Guntner, 44 N.E. 1077 (1896); Plant v. Woods, 57 N.E. 1011 (1900).  
 12. See Plant, 57 N.E. at 1015–16 (Holmes, C.J., dissenting). 
 13. Vegalahn, 44 N.E. at 1077–78; G. EDWARD WHITE, JUSTICE OLIVER WENDELL 
HOLMES: LAW AND THE INNER SELF 286–87 (1993). 
6 - NEWTON.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 7/11/19  6:30 PM 
2019] BOOK REVIEW 423 
 
enter a shop does not necessarily convey a threat of bodily harm. 
No doubt they understand that the prerogative of force as such 
belongs to the state alone.14 Moreover, the intention to harm one’s 
adversary is not necessarily unlawful: 
The fact, that the immediate object of the act by which the 
benefit to themselves is to be gained is to injure their 
antagonist, does not necessarily make it unlawful, any more 
than when a great house lowers the price of goods for the 
purpose, and with the effect, of driving a smaller antagonist 
from the business.15 
The basis of the court’s decision rests on the tacit interest of 
the faction to which it belongs. A community is comprised of 
factions and the current court represents the interests of one, the 
rich, while the upholsterers represents those of another, the poor. 
Man is selfish and all association is magnified selfishness: 
The true grounds of decision are considerations of policy and 
of social advantage, and it is vain to suppose that solutions can 
be attained merely by logic and the general propositions of law 
which nobody disputes. Propositions as to public policy rarely 
are unanimously accepted, and still more rarely, if ever, 
capable of unanswerable proof. . . .  
One of the eternal conflicts out of which life is made up is that 
between the effort of every man to get the most he can for his 
services, and that of society, disguised under the name of 
capital, to get his services for the least possible return. 
Combination on the one side is patent and powerful. 
Combination on the other is the necessary and desirable 
counterpart, if the battle is to be carried on in a fair and equal 
way.16 
“Fair and equal” for Holmes means a degree of “free 
competition” between the various factions within the community. 
And if the law as presently written should construe “free 
competition” too narrowly, Holmes suggests substituting for it the 
“free struggle for life.”17 The upholsterers, the poor, are one 
combination struggling for dominance and ought to be given the 
same leeway as the other combination of capital, the rich. 
Nowhere does Holmes acknowledge the interests of the 
 
 14. Vegalahn, 44 N.E. at 1080 (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
 15. Id. at 1082. 
 16. Id. at 1080, 1081. 
 17. Id. at 1081. 
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community as a whole, as that would imply a common good; 
nowhere does he concede the right of workers to be treated in a 
certain manner, as that would imply natural right. Holmes’ dissent 
in Vegelahn is the result of his rejection of the common good and 
natural right. It is the result of his early conclusion about human 
nature announced in his article, “The Gas-Stokers’ Strike.” It is 
the result of deduction. 
Holmes’ article concerns an English trial in which an English 
company prosecuted five men for conspiracy, a conspiracy that 
the company claimed resulted in the gas stokers’ strike in 1872. 
The company required its employees to give notice of any 
intention to leave work ranging from one week to thirty days, 
depending upon their specific job and contract. The majority of 
the stokers were united in a union. One of their members was 
terminated for an unknown reason, and the union demanded 
reinstatement. When the company refused to comply, the union 
refused to work on December 2, plunging the city of London into 
partial darkness for several days. While the union employed no 
violence toward the company’s officers, it used violence and 
threats on some of its own wavering members. The company took 
the union’s five principal officers to court where they were found 
guilty of the criminal act of hindering or preventing the company 
from conducting its business by breaking their contracts.18 
Holmes objects to the court’s verdict on the same grounds as 
he would later dissent in Vegelahn. He begins by denying the 
existence of a common good. “But the objection which we wish to 
express at the present time is, that this [i.e., logic establishing 
permanent rules of government] presupposes an identity of 
interests between the different parts of a community which does 
not exist in fact.”19 Holmes continues in language he would later 
employ in Vegelahn: 
This tacit assumption of the solidarity of the interests of society 
is very common, but seems to us to be false. The struggle for 
life, undoubtedly, is constantly putting the interests of men at 
variance with those of the lower animals. And the struggle does 
 
 18. See Holmes, Strike, supra note 6, at 582. The above case details, as well as a 
detailed examination of “The Gas-Stokers’ Strike” and “Natural Law” as they relate to 
Holmes’ jurisprudence, may be found in Benjamin Patrick Newton, Mr. Justice Hobbes? 
On the Jurisprudence of Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr., 7 AM. POL. THOUGHT 464, 465–73 
(2018).  
 19. See Holmes, Strike, supra note 6, at 583. 
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not stop in the ascending scale with the monkeys, but is equally 
the law of human existence. Outside of legislation this is 
undeniable. It is mitigated by sympathy, prudence, and all the 
social and moral qualities. But in the last resort a man rightly 
prefers his own interest to that of his neighbors. And this is as 
true in legislation as in any other form of corporate action. All 
that can be expected from modern improvements is that 
legislation should easily and quickly, yet not too quickly, 
modify itself in accordance with the will of the de facto supreme 
power in the community, and that the spread of an educated 
sympathy should reduce the sacrifice of minorities to a 
minimum. But whatever body may possess the supreme power 
for the moment is certain to have interests inconsistent with 
others which have competed unsuccessfully.20 
Again, man is selfish and all association is mere magnified 
selfishness. An association of gas-stokers, the poor, can be 
expected in the “struggle for life” to compete with an association 
of capital, the rich. If the stokers and workers like them should 
“possess the supreme power for the moment,” one can expect 
them to legislate “interests inconsistent with others which have 
competed unsuccessfully.” Later, capital or still another faction 
may seize power from labor, on and on, one arbitrary faction 
replacing another, endlessly. The function of the judge is to glean 
“the will of the de facto supreme power in the community” and 
rule accordingly. It is no accident that Holmes wrote de facto 
rather than de jure. This is the growth of the law as Holmes 
understood it.21 All that can be hoped for in these continual coups 
is that, “the spread of an educated sympathy should reduce the 
sacrifice of minorities to a minimum.” Or, as Holmes would later 
say, “force, mitigated so far as may be by good manners,”22 or, still 
 
 20. Id. 
 21. See Holmes, Path, supra note 7, at 457: 
When we study law we are not studying a mystery but a well known [sic] 
profession. We are studying what we shall want in order to appear before judges, 
or to advise people in such a way as to keep them out of court. The reason why it 
is a profession, why people will pay lawyers to argue for them or to advise them, 
is that in societies like ours the command of the public force is intrusted [sic] to 
the judges in certain cases, and the whole power of the state will be put forth, if 
necessary, to carry out their judgments and decrees. People want to know under 
what circumstances and how far they will run the risk of coming against what is 
so much stronger than themselves, and hence it becomes a business to find out 
when this danger is to be feared. The object of our study, then, is prediction, the 
prediction of the incidence of the public force through the instrumentality of the 
courts. 
 22. Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes to Frederick Pollock (Feb. 1, 1920), in 2 
HOLMES-POLLOCK LETTERS 36 (Mark DeWolfe Howe ed., 1941): 
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more succinctly, “force, mitigated by politeness.”23 And he would 
maintain this position on man’s asocial nature throughout his 
life.24 
And yet the faction of the moment cannot legislate with its 
genuine interests in mind because man cannot know what is good 
for him. Nowhere in Vegelahn or “The Gas-Stokers’ Strike” is 
natural right acknowledged, only arbitrary, shifting preferences. 
Holmes’ most explicit rejection of natural right, even the right to 
self-preservation, in favor of force, occurs in his essay, “Natural 
Law”: 
No doubt it is true that, so far as we can see ahead, some 
arrangements and the rudiments of familiar institutions seem 
to be necessary elements in any society that may spring from 
our own and that would seem to us to be civilized—some form 
of permanent association between the sexes—some residue of 
property individually owned—some mode of binding oneself 
to specified future conduct—at the bottom of all, some 
protection for the person. But without speculating whether a 
group is imaginable in which all but the last of these might 
disappear and the last be subject to qualifications that most of 
us would abhor, the question remains as to the Ought of natural 
law. . . .  
The most fundamental of the supposed preëxisting rights—the 
right to life—is sacrificed without a scruple not only in war, but 
whenever the interest of society, that is, of the predominant 
 
I do think that man at present is a predatory animal. I think that the sacredness 
of human life is a purely municipal ideal of no validity outside the jurisdiction. I 
believe that force, mitigated so far as may be by good manners, is the ultima ratio, 
and between two groups that want to make inconsistent kinds of world I see no 
remedy except force. 
 23. Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes to Harold Laski (Mar. 7, 1928), in 2 
HOLMES-LASKI LETTERS 1035 (Mark DeWolfe Howe ed., 1953) (“With your belief in 
some apriorities like equality you may have difficulties.  I who believe in force (mitigated 
by politeness) have no trouble—and if I were sincere and were asked certain whys by a 
woman should reply, ‘Because Ma’am I am the bull.’”). 
 24. Compare his position in “The Gas-Stokers’ Strike” made in 1873 with two near-
identical statements, the one above in the letter to Frederick Pollock in 1920, supra note 
22, and the other below made in The Common Law in 1881: 
But it seems to me clear that the ultima ratio, not only regum, but of private 
persons, is force, and that at the bottom of all private relations, however 
tempered by sympathy and all the social feelings, is a justifiable self-preference. 
If a man is on a plank in the deep sea which will only float one, and a stranger 
lays hold of it, he will thrust him off if he can. When the state finds itself in a 
similar position, it does the same thing.   
OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 38 (Mark DeWolfe Howe ed., Harvard 
Univ. Press 1963) (1881) (“Lecture II: The Criminal Law”). 
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power in the community, is thought to demand it.25 
 
It is strange that while “Natural Law” is not discussed by 
Kellogg, excerpts from two of Holmes’ letters in which the same 
language is used are cited and discussed by him (pp. 181n.38, 186). 
In sum, Holmes’ early conclusions, that man is asocial and that 
what cannot be quantified cannot be known, led him to deduce 
judicial rulings consistent with legal positivism, that is, with a 
jurisprudence in which the predominant power of the community 
and its perceived interest are arbitrary. Holmes deduced that law 
rests on force. 
Frederic R. Kellogg’s Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr. and Legal 
Logic is recommended to political scientists, legal academicians, 
and other jurists interested in the jurisprudence of Justice Oliver 
Wendell Holmes, but with the above cautions. Let readers draw 
their own conclusions. 
 
 
 25. Holmes, Natural Law, supra note 6, at 41, 42. Compare this passage with Holmes’ 
letter to Harold Laski, (Oct. 26, 1919), in 1 HOLMES-LASKI LETTERS, supra note 23, at 
217: 
When you are thoroughly convinced that you are right—whole-heartedly desire 
an end—and have no doubt of your power to accomplish it, I see nothing but 
municipal regulations to interfere with your using your power to accomplish it. 
The sacredness of human life is a formula that is good only inside a system of 
law—and so of the rest—all which apart from its banalit. . . I fear seems cold talk 
if you have been made to feel popular displeasure. 
